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What Have Changes to the Global 
Markets for Goods and Services 
Done to the Viability of the Swedish 
Welfare State?
Edward E. Leamer
9.1    Introduction
When we learned professors from America, together with our distin-
guished Swedish colleagues, examined Sweden a decade ago and reported 
our ﬁ  ndings in Freeman, Topel, and Swedenborg (1997), we oﬀered our 
heartfelt but dour prognostication: this dog will never win a race—not hob-
bled by its welfare state. But like real three-  legged dogs, the performance 
of the Swedish economy since last we examined this patient has been in 
many ways superior, including a growth rate of real gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita in the years 1995 to 2004 equal to 2.4 percent per year, 
compared with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) average of 2.2 percent (OECD 2005).
This might be a surprise to Leamer and Lundborg (1997), who warned 
that there are deep inconsistencies between the egalitarian goals of a welfare 
state and the ongoing but largely incomplete task of integrating masses 
of low-  wage unskilled third-  world workers into the global trading system. 
“Not really so surprising,” Leamer and Lundborg might reply, as their 
conceptual framework applies to the long run, and the performance over 
the last decade may have been dominated by short-  run circumstances that 
mask the long-  run problems. It is best to keep in mind that a free-  market 
economic system cannot tolerate persistent vast geographical diﬀerences in 
prices of gold or wages of unskilled workers, unless those diﬀerences have a 
technological/  cost basis. With that dogged persistence, I oﬀer you my mes-
sage again, updated to address two startling changes in the global economy 
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in the last decade: the remarkable growth of Chinese exports (more of the 
same, but lots more) and the communications revolution we call the Internet 
(a new and entirely diﬀerent kind of threat).
9.1.1      Rise of China as a Manufacturing Powerhouse
It is not news that the liberalizations of China, India, Eastern Europe, 
Russia, and so on have increased the eﬀective global supply of workers will-
ing and able to do mundane manufacturing jobs at very low-  wage rates 
under uncomfortable working conditions.1 What is news is the remarkable 
speed at which millions of Chinese manufacturing workers are being inte-
grated into the global trading system.
Part of the rise of China and other low-  wage manufacturers comes from 
continued improvements in governance of global trade that have apparently 
reduced the risk of government interference in business transactions across 
national borders. That risk reduction plus improvements in transportation 
and communication have allowed ﬁ  rms to fragment supply chains, seeking 
the most cost-  eﬀective location for each point in the chain, in particularly 
by moving mundane labor- intensive assembly operations to low- wage loca-
tions. (According to the September 18, 2005 edition of the Los Angeles 
Times, 60 to 70 percent of the new Boeing 787 Dreamliner will be produced 
overseas, some of it in China.)
Meanwhile, at greater speed than ever before, standardization and mecha-
nization are turning rooted innovative new products into footloose stan-
dardized commodities, where cost is the competitive driver. This has allowed 
Asian low- cost suppliers, particularly China, to enter markets in electronics 
and machinery that heretofore were completely controlled by the high- wage 
countries. To give a pertinent example, hardly any of the IBM mainframe 
computers were manufactured in low- wage countries, but the personal com-
puter had a shelf life of only a few years as far as U.S. manufacturing workers 
were concerned.
9.1.2      The Transition to a Postindustrial Economy: 
The Personal Computer and the Internet
The fraction of the global workforce in manufacturing is under persistent 
pressure to contract because of the steady march of productivity, which 
allows fewer workers to do the tasks of many. This technological reduc-
1. The global competition for manufacturing jobs is made more intense because the high 
savings rates in Asia and other developing countries limit their demand for manufactured 
products. The transfer of manufacturing jobs from Northern Europe and North America to 
Eastern Europe and Asia thus tends to reduce the global total of manufacturing jobs, because 
the reduction in demand for manufactures in high-  wage high-  spending Europe and North 
America is not mitigated much by an increase in demand for manufactures in low-  wage high-
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tion in the global number of manufacturing workers might be oﬀset by 
new demand for new manufactured products and by increases in demand 
for existing products because of rising income levels and falling manufac-
tured prices. But in the last three decades, the force of process innovation 
has outstripped the opposing forces of product innovation, rising income 
levels, and falling prices, and the fraction of the workforce in manufacturing 
has substantially fallen in Sweden and in every other OECD country. (The 
Swedish share of manufacturing has fallen from 26 percent in 1970 to 16 
percent in 2003.2)
This decline in manufacturing means that a rising fraction of the work-
force has to be absorbed either by government or private services. It means 
that increasingly, the sources of growth will come from services. This is 
troubling, because in the last decade, the production of both mundane and 
creative intellectual services has been completely revolutionalized by the 
Internet and the personal computer (PC). The Internet, which has been 
likened to the printing press in terms of its potential eﬀects on the way 
we communicate, is increasing the intensity of price competition among 
manufactures and is allowing the costless delivery of some knowledge ser-
vices across borders. The Internet and the PC are altering the labor markets’ 
compensation for education and talent.
The transition from artisan shop to factory ﬂ  oor came with a great deskill-
ing of manufacturing and good jobs for high school graduates. Education 
and natural talent had mostly additive eﬀects on earnings, with decent 
returns to educational investments for almost everyone. With that structure 
of earnings, compensatory education could easily oﬀset talent deﬁ  cien-
cies—if you and I are both trained to operate a forklift, we will be equally 
productive, no matter your strength advantage over me. But in a postindus-
trial PC/ Internet age, compensation in the intellectual service sector may be 
determined more by the interaction of talent and education, meaning that 
the rate of return to education depends substantially on the talent of the 
student—if you and I are both trained to operate a computer, one of us is 
going to do a lot better than the other. This creates a Hollywood kind of 
inequality for which compensatory education is ineﬀective—without the 
talent, you cannot be a star.
It’s not just talent. It’s also hard work. In the industrial age, the problem 
was capital scarcity. That capital scarcity was relieved by hiring workers who 
were willing to operate the equipment at a high pace for long hours, thereby 
spreading the ﬁ  xed capital cost over a large total output. In order to get 
workers to operate the equipment at a high pace for long hours, workers had 
to have an incentive, which has meant higher wages in manufacturing than in 
agriculture or services and higher wages in capital-  intensive manufacturing 
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than in labor-  intensive manufacturing. That wage inequality causes some 
diﬃculty for an egalitarian state, of course, though access for most to the 
high-  pace high-  wage jobs in capital-  intensive manufacturing is a politically 
mitigating factor.
Compensation is very diﬀerent in the creative intellectual services. In the 
intellectual services, talent, not capital or worker time, is the scarce input. 
An eﬃcient postindustrial economy cannot aﬀord to have idle talent for 
the same reason that an eﬃcient industrial economy cannot aﬀord to have 
idle capital. Eﬃciency thus requires that the most talented among us work 
longer hours than the less talented. The Swedish decline in hours worked 
that is described in Davis and Henrekson (chapter 7 in this volume) and the 
compression of wage rates may be incompatible with eﬃcient production 
in the intellectual services sector. Extreme disparities in rates of compensa-
tion in Hollywood and on Wall Street properly encourage long hours of 
talented workers, and the combined eﬀects of long hours for the talented 
with enormous hourly compensation creates in Hollywood vast inequality 
that is deeply inconsistent with an egalitarian state. It’s not just Hollywood. 
It’s also all the other professions—law, architecture, accounting, medicine, 
and even economics.
This isn’t news for Sweden, which experienced the friction between its 
welfare state and the creative services sector when Ingmar Bergman, after 
being arrested for tax evasion in 1976, suﬀered a mental breakdown and 
then went into self-  imposed exile in Germany. That may be an apocryphal 
story replayed quietly but repeatedly as creative Swedes make the diﬃcult 
choice between staying at home with comfortable livelihoods versus moving 
abroad, where the compensation for their ideas and creative products may 
seem limitless.
These two problems—the rise of China and the transition to a postin-
dustrial economy—are addressed in separate sections of this chapter. The 
rise of China as a manufacturing powerhouse can be entirely beneﬁ  cial for 
Sweden. The force of Chinese competition falls on countries that produce 
the same products, and high- wage countries that compete in the same prod-
uct space as low-  wage competitors inevitably must suﬀer wage reductions 
and slower growth, but investments in skills, human capital, and product 
innovations can support a product mix unlike the ones made in China, in 
which case the lowering of prices for Chinese products is all to the good. The 
next section provides an answer to the question, which countries compete 
with Sweden? This question is related but not identical to the question that 
Leamer and Lundborg (1997) posed: are Swedish wages set in Beijing? This 
section assembles a large amount of information about Swedish exports in 
comparison with other countries. There are some ominous developments 
here, especially the rapid rise of Chinese exports and their move up the value 
added chain, but all in all, the locus of Swedish competition remains (hap-
pily) in high-  wage Europe, the United States, and Japan.What Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    2 8 9
In the third section, I oﬀer some theory and evidence of the transi-
tion from industrial to postindustrial societies, a transition that is being 
experienced by all advanced developed countries. This section is largely 
speculative, because countries are at the beginning of their transitions 
from industrial to postindustrial societies, with relatively little clear evi-
dence of what that transition entails. One clear symptom of this transi-
tion is the decline in the value added share of manufactures and the rise 
in the value added share of ﬁ  nance and other intellectual services—what 
I am calling neurofacturing. With that as the backdrop, I contrast earn-
ings and hours in ﬁ  nance with earnings and hours in manufacturing, 
in the United States, and in Sweden. Finance in the United States is 
characterized by long hours and exceptional pay. Sweden seems to have 
adopted a diﬀerent solution. But I do not provide any evidence that the 
extraordinary levels of compensation for the leaders of the U.S. ﬁ  nan-
cial system have anything to do with any special talent, other than being 
in the right place at the right time, and I do not provide evidence that 
U.S. ﬁ  nance is more eﬃcient by virtue of it compensation system. The 
clearer cases of U.S. talent-  driven compensation are in entertainment 
and sports. But I also don’t provide evidence that the Ingmar Bergman 
experience is common in Sweden. This section is intended to be thought 
provoking, suggesting, but not proving, that the transition to a postin-
dustrial economy will put greater strain on the egalitarian aims of the 
Swedish welfare system.
9.2      Who Competes with Sweden?
Our ﬁ  rst item of business is to look closely at the structure of Swedish 
exports to determine if the source of competition for Swedish products 
remains in the high- wage countries or if it has shifted south toward low- wage 
developing nations. To do that, I will be proposing a new measure of the 
extent to which exports from other countries compete with Swedish exports. 
This new measure suggests that in the U.S. market, it is Japan and Canada 
that historically have been Sweden’s greatest competitors, but the degree of 
competition with these two principal competitors fell sharply from 1989 to 
2004, while the degree of competition with China, Korea, and Mexico rose 
substantially. This is highly suggestive of a shift southward of the center of 
Swedish competition in manufactures. Incidentally, no correction is made 
for the part of Chinese exports that originate in high- wage countries such as 
Japan, but cost advantages apply to any export from China, no matter the 
value added fraction that originates elsewhere.
9.2.1      The Distinctiveness Barrier to Factor Price Equalization
The factor price equalization theorem is often invoked to support the 
alarming idea that international trade soon enough will equalize wages in 290    Edward  E.  Leamer
Stockholm, Los Angeles, Mexico City, and Shanghai. This is a possibility 
but is by no means a sure thing.
One important reason why wages might not equalize across counties is 
diﬀerences in product mix. The force for factor price equalization comes 
through the product market, but that force is completely inoperable if Swe-
den and other countries produce no products in common. There are a great 
variety of barriers that support distinctive product mixes and that help to 
prevent the equalization of wages in Stockholm and Shanghai. A natural 
barrier is the economic distinctiveness that comes from natural resources 
and from climate. For example, a country that exports softwood lumber 
products in exchange for apparel and footwear need not fear the low wages 
paid for the production of apparel and footwear. On the contrary, the lower 
the wages, the better, because that supports a terms-  of-  trade improvement, 
providing more shirts and shoes for each cord of wood or ream of paper 
exported.
The role of product diﬀerences in preventing wage equalization is illus-
trated well by contrasting a Ricardian model with a Heckscher-  Ohlin (HO) 
model of international trade. In a Ricardian equilibrium, distinctive abilities 
lead to complete specialization according to one’s comparative advantage. 
Countries with diﬀerent abilities produce diﬀerent mixes of products and 
are partners that share the gains from specialization, not competitors. In a 
Ricardian model, the gains from trade raise wages everywhere.
But in a Heckscher- Ohlin model, comparative advantage is marginal and 
is eroded as countries move to specialize according to their comparative 
advantage. In a simple Heckscher-  Ohlin equilibrium, comparative advan-
tage at the margin is completely eliminated; all countries produce the same 
mix of products and are consequently competitors, not partners. Though the 
inframarginal gains from exchange raise aggregate incomes for all countries, 
the remaining marginal competition forces an equalization of the rewards 
to all factors of production, including labor. Countries abundant in labor 
with low pretrade wages enjoy increased wages as their abundant factor ﬁ  nds 
external demand, but countries scarce in labor with high pretrade wages 
suﬀer reduced wages as the scarcity rents are eroded by foreign competi-
tion.
What drives the factor price equalization theorem is a sequence of zero-
 proﬁ  t conditions that equate the prices of products to their costs of pro-
duction:
pi   ALi w   AKi r   . . . , i   1, 2, . . . ,
where pi is the price of product i, ALi and AKi are the amounts of labor and 
capital (and other factors) needed to produce a unit of the good, and w and 
r refer to the wage rate and the rental cost of capital. If there are enough of 
these zero-  proﬁ  t conditions (if the number of traded products equals the 
number of factors of production) and if the input intensities Ai are ﬁ  xed, What Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    2 9 1
then it is a simple matter to solve this linear system for the wages and rental 
rates of capital as a function of the product prices.3
Thus, if international trade equalizes product prices, it also must equal-
ize factor prices—wages and rental rates of capital. Trade in products is a 
complete substitute for trade in factors of production.
Lurking in the background behind the simple zero-  proﬁ  t equations that 
allow one to solve for factor prices given product prices are a number of 
critical assumptions that may not be fully met. These are conditions that 
are needed to assure (a) product price equalization and (b) identical input 
intensities. Here are some of the assumptions:
•    Traded goods are commodities whose prices are set in global market-
places. (Firms produce undiﬀerentiated products and have no market 
power.)
•    Transportation costs are zero. There are no other barriers to trade.
•    The best methods of production are common knowledge; there are no 
ﬁ  rst-  mover advantages.
•    The services of the factors of production—land, labor, and capital—
are also undiﬀerentiated internationally and are available in nationally 
integrated rental markets.
•    The factors of production are costlessly mobile across ﬁ  rms/  sectors.
•   Production occurs at constant returns to scale; there are no beneﬁ  ts 
from agglomerations.
While violation of one or more of these conditions will allow sustained 
diﬀerences in (pretax) wages between Stockholm and Los Angeles, the 
substantial gap in wages between Stockholm and Shanghai may rely 
especially on the violation of another critical condition: all countries are 
suﬃciently similar in factor endowments so that they produce the same 
mix of products.
Technically speaking, if diﬀerent countries produce diﬀerent mixes of 
products, they solve diﬀerent sets of zero-  proﬁ  t conditions to determine 
wages and other factors of production, and factor-  price equalization need 
not apply.
Though identical product mix and factor price equalization are often 
taken as implications of a Heckscher-  Ohlin model, this HO framework is 
also capable of producing a Ricardian-  like equilibrium, in which countries 
sort into distinct groups with diﬀerent product mixes. Factor price equal-
ization then operates within the groups but not between. As in the Ricard-
ian model, countries are competitors within the groups deﬁ  ned by product 
3. If the technology allows substitution among the factors and thus variable factor intensi-
ties, ALi and AKi, the proof of factor price equalization is a bit more involved, requiring that the 
technologies do not exhibit factor- intensity reversals, which would allow two or more solutions 
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mixes, but between groups, they are partners, mutually enjoying the gains 
from specialization. Then trade is a tide that lifts all boats.
What determines the product mix? In a Heckscher- Ohlin model, the prod-
uct mix is dictated by the availability of land, labor, and capital. If coun-
tries are suﬃciently similar in their supplies of these productive resources, 
then the equilibrium has all countries producing the same mix of products, 
but if countries are greatly diﬀerent, the multicone equilibrium occurs with 
countries producing diﬀerent product mixes. For example, capital- abundant 
countries might produce a capital-  intensive mix of products and have high 
wages and low returns to capital, while labor- abundant countries might pro-
duce a labor-  intensive product mix and have low wages and high returns to 
capital.
If an equilibrium with diﬀerent wages in diﬀerent countries does emerge, 
there are powerful forces that work to destroy it. Diﬀerences in factor prices 
create arbitrage opportunities that can be pursued by migration of labor and 
capital. If there is enough international factor mobility, then countries can 
become suﬃciently similar so that the two-  wage solution is unsustainable. 
Even without capital mobility, high savings and investment rates responding 
to the higher returns in capital- scarce countries can eliminate the dissimilari-
ties in countries that are necessary to support the multicone equilibrium.
9.2.2      Empirical Measurement of Product Mix Similarities
The message of the HO model is that while ample stocks of human and 
physical capital historically have helped to create a high barrier to protect 
Swedish workers from low-  wage foreign competition, those barriers will be 
constantly under assault as the low- wage countries invest heavily in physical 
and education assets and shift their product mix ever closer to the Swed-
ish capital-  intensive mix. In the face of capital accumulation in low-  wage 
countries, the distinctiveness barriers protecting Swedish wages can be main-
tained only by the maintenance of Swedish distinctiveness through further 
investments in education and infrastructure that maintain Sweden as the 
preferred place to produce high-  tech, human-  capital-  intensive products.
There are several ways to measure progress in the race to stay ahead of the 
emerging low-  wage countries, none of which is perfect. One approach is to 
compare Swedish educational attainments and rates of investment in new 
capital with the same in countries whose low wages might threaten Swedish 
wages, as in Leamer and Lundborg (1997). This can be a blunt instrument, 
because knowledge of the global distribution of human and physical capital 
by itself cannot tell us whether Sweden is a partner or a competitor of China 
and other low-  wage countries. It depends on how much of each productive 
resource is absorbed in nontraded goods, and it depends also on the tech-
nologies of production.
Another way to measure Swedish distinctiveness is to compare the prod-
ucts made in Sweden and the products made in China and other countries. What Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    2 9 3
Are they the same or not? If they are the same, and if they are traded, that 
makes Sweden and China competitors.
As is often the case, the theory yields important insights, but there is a 
great gulf between the literal theory and the real world. In the theory, prod-
uct mix diﬀerences can be determined merely by the presence or absence of 
a product in the mix originating in each country. In reality, data are collected 
at a high enough level of aggregation that almost every product category 
is present in almost every country. If the category is women’s dresses, high-
 fashion gowns might be sewn in Los Angeles and Boston, while high- volume 
standardized dresses might be sewn in Guonddong.4 Thus, to measure Swed-
ish distinctiveness through its product mix, we will have to tolerate a some-
what casual link between the theory and the data.
We also will want to make use of export data, which are much more 
detailed than production or value added data. The problem with export data 
is that Chinese wages can come to Stockholm, because Swedish exporters 
compete in the same foreign markets as the Chinese, or because Swedish 
imports from China compete with Swedish production sold at home. A focus 
on exports ignores competition at home.
9.2.3      Export Correlations to the United States and the European Union
Correlations across products of Swedish exports to the United States and 
the European Union with the exports of other countries for 1987 and 1999 
are illustrated in ﬁ  gure 9.1 and ﬁ  gure 9.2. These ﬁ  gures are sorted by similar-
ity with Sweden in 1987, lowest to highest. At the right are the countries one 
suspects are the greatest competitors of Sweden. These countries on the right 
are oﬀering these two large marketplaces about the same mix of products as 
Sweden oﬀers. That means that for the 1987 EU market, Sweden’s closest 
competitors were Finland, Germany, Canada, and the United States, and for 
the United States market, they were Germany, Canada, Mexico, and Japan. 
(Note that this comparison doesn’t depend at all on total export values, only 
on the composition.) At the left in these ﬁ  gures are countries with export 
mixes unlike Sweden’s. These are generally low-  wage developing countries, 
such as China, Turkey, and Malaysia.
These 1987 correlations were good news for Sweden, as they suggest that 
Sweden had successfully isolated itself from the force of competition with 
the emerging low-  wage exporters through a fortuitous choice of product 
mix, with Sweden concentrating on one set of exports and the low-  wage 
developing world concentrating on another.
But ﬁ  gure 9.1 and ﬁ  gure 9.2 also reveal that things changed dramatically 
from 1987 to 1999, with sharply rising correlations between Swedish exports 
4. If disaggregation were pursued far enough to create separate categories for high-  fashion 
gowns and standardized dresses, we would need to deal with another problem: high-  fashion 
gowns are not commodities sold in global markets, and global product price equalization could 
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and exports of many of the low-  wage developing countries in both the U.S. 
and EU markets. This is a very ominous development. We need to ﬁ  nd out 
why these correlations have elevated so much. We also need to determine if 
these correlations are the correct measures of the problem.
9.2.4      A Measure of the Competition between Two Exporters
The increase over time in the correlation between the mix of Swedish 
exports and the mix of Chinese exports is suggestive of an increase in the 
intensity of competition. Another commonly used measure is the Finger-
  Kreinen export similarity index, to be discussed later. Neither of these 
measures depends on the level of exports coming from the hypothetical 
competitor, and neither answers a clear economic question based on a clear 
economic model. I suggest another measure that answers this question: which 
Fig. 9.1    Who competes with Sweden? Product mix correlation coeﬃcient with 
Sweden, exports to the U.S. market, 1987 and 1999, three-  digit ISIC
Note: Major global exporters, Swedish trading partners, and rest of the world (sorted from 
left to right by 1987 value).
Fig. 9.2    Who competes with Sweden? Product mix correlation coeﬃcient with 
Sweden, exports to the EU market, 1987 and 1999, three-  digit ISIC
Note: Major global exporters and Swedish trading partners (sorted from left to right by 1987 
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countries have the greatest impact on the prices that Sweden receives for its 
exports?
Expressed more precisely, the question is: what would be the impact on 
the value of Swedish exports if a competitor were to double the quantity of 
its exports while Sweden held ﬁ  xed the quantity of its exports?
To answer this question, we need to commit to a model of competition, 
and we need to know the values of the models’ most important parameters: 
the price elasticities. In principle, one might carry out an econometric exer-
cise that estimated an elaborate model of demand, with products distin-
guished by place of production. Well, short of that lofty goal, I will assume 
that all products in a given disaggregated product category are perfectly 
substitutable, in which case it is the global supply that determines the Swed-
ish price. Then, the impact on Swedish prices from a doubling of competitor 
exports depends on the size of the competitor. If, for example, the Chinese 
currently have a 1 percent market share, then a doubling of Chinese output 
would increase global output by a little less than 1 percent, driving down 
Swedish prices in that category by an amount that depends on the product 
price elasticity. For the numbers reported next, the price elasticities are all 
assumed to be equal to negative one, and the exposure of Swedish export 
prices to Chinese exports is simply equal to the weighted average Chinese 
market share, weighted by the importance of the product, measured by the 
Swedish export share.
Unlike the correlations discussed in the previous section, this measure 
properly allows for the economic size of a competitor. After all, if the com-
petitor hardly exported anything, the competition for Sweden is small, even 
if the mixes of products are similar. But be alert, while I have given the pro-
posed measure an explicit theoretical basis, that theoretical basis is entirely 
unlike the Heckscher- Ohlin model. In particular, no formal attempt is made 
to connect these measures with Swedish wages, though implicitly the mecha-
nism is a terms-  of-  trade eﬀect. Thus, our question is, which countries are 
large enough and similar enough to Sweden to aﬀect the Swedish terms of 
trade?
In contrast, the Heckscher- Ohlin factor price equalization theory depends 
on the relative prices of labor- intensive products. The HO question is, which 
exporters of labor-  intensive products are large enough to aﬀect relative 
prices of labor-  intensive products made in Sweden?
Notation
Measures of the intensity of competition between two exporters in third 
markets depend on the following data: xj
c   export quantity by country c to 
destination/ product  market  j; pj   export price in destination/  product mar-
ket j, assumed to be the same for all exporters; Tc   total value of exports 
of country c   Σjpjxj
c; Ij
c   importance fraction of product j for country 
c   country c value share of export j   pjxj
c/ (Σjpjxj
c); and Mj
c   country c 
market share of export j   pjxj
c/ (Σcpjxj
c).296    Edward  E.  Leamer
Note that the importance measures sum to one, ΣjIj
c   1, while the market 
shares, which sum to the average market share multiplied by the number of 
products, depend on the size of the exporter, as well as the composition of 
exports.
Finger and Kreinin’s Export Similarity Index
A commonly used measure of the similarity of exports of two countries 
(e.g., Sweden and China) to a third market is Finger and Kreinin’s (1979) 
export similarity index, which is equal to the sum of the minimum of the 
importance measures:




Figure 9.3 illustrates the calculation based on importance distributions for 
Chinese and Swedish exports to a third market (e.g., the United States). The 
horizontal axis is a hypothetical measure of product sophistication, and it is 
assumed that the Chinese exports are concentrated at the lower end and the 
Swedish exports at the upper end. The overlap is the minimum value of the 
two importance numbers, and the ESI (export similarity index) is the area 
of the indicated overlap region.
This measure does have the feature that it is equal to zero if there is no 
overlap of products and is equal to one if the distributions are identical, but 
there are many other measures of the diﬀerence between two densities that 
have that feature. A very popular nonparametric measure is the Kolmogorov-
  Smirnov (KS) distance, which is the maximum diﬀerence between the two 
cumulative distributions. One minus the KS distance seems like an equally 
good measure, because it is also equal to one if the distributions are identical 
and is equal to zero if they do not overlap at all. (But the KS measure does 
require an ordering, like the skill intensity, because otherwise there is no 
way to compute the cumulative.)
What’s the Question?
If the answer is the Finger and Kreinin export similarity index or the 
Kolmogorov- Smirnov statistic, it seems appropriate to ask, what is the ques-
tion? I can’t imagine what it might be.
One good question would be this: what would be the percentage reduc-
tion in the value of Sweden’s total export if China were to double its exports 
of every product, assuming the elasticities in all markets were equal to nega-
tive one?
The following measure answers this question:




This is the inner product of the Swedish importance and the Chinese 
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large market share of the exports that are most important for Sweden. Note 
that this is not a symmetric measure: the degree of competition for Sweden’s 
exports from China is not the same as the degree of competition for China’s 
exports from Sweden. Even if the composition of exports were exactly the 
same, the larger country competes for the smaller country’s exports, but not 
the other way around.
The algebra needed to derive this measure is reported in the appendix.
Sweden and China Competing for the U.S. Market
Table 9.1 reports the competition measures applicable to exports to the 
United States for Sweden vis-  à-  vis the major exporters and regions of the 
world, excluding these major exporters. These are sorted by the change in 
the competition measures.
The measure of Chinese competition for Swedish exports to the United 
States rose from 0.5 percent in 1989 to 5.3 percent in 2004. Keep in mind that 
this is intended to estimate the eﬀect on the value of Swedish exports to the 
United States if China were to double its exports and thereby drive down 
the prices of products for which the Chinese market share is considerable. 
By this measure, China hardly mattered in 1989 but became the number 
eight competitor by 2004.
Though Japan (12.7 percent) and Canada (12.5 percent) remained in 2004 
the most important sources of competition for Swedish products in the 
U.S. marketplace, both had experienced sharp reductions in their competi-
tion intensities from lofty 1989 levels (27.8 percent and 19.4 percent). These 
reductions were oﬀset by large gains for China, Korea, and Mexico.
Fig. 9.3    Finger and Kreinin export similarity measure: A measure of the overlap of 
two distributions of exports sum of the minimum of the importance fractions298    Edward  E.  Leamer
This raises some serious questions regarding the extent of competition for 
Swedish jobs. Are Swedish wages set in Guangdong, Seoul, and Monterrey? 
If not now, what about a decade from now?
We need to do a little detective work to ﬁ  nd out what accounts for the 
rise in the competition between China and Sweden. Is it merely the rise in 
Chinese exports overall, or is there some signiﬁ  cant change in the Chinese 
product mix—a more worrisome possibility? Product detail for comput-
ing the competition for Swedish exports to the United States coming from 
China is reported in table 9.2 at the two-  digit Standard International Trade 
Classiﬁ  cation (SITC) level of aggregation. The columns labeled “Swedish 
importance” are the Swedish shares of exports to the United States. The 
denominator in that fraction is total Swedish exports to the United States. 
For example, SITC 76, “telecommunications equipment, etc.” in the ﬁ  rst row 
of the table, comprised 1.7 percent of Swedish exports to the United States 
in 1989 and 8.7 percent in 2004.
The columns labeled “Chinese market share” are the Chinese fractions 
of U.S. imports. For example, 3.4 percent of U.S. imports of SITC 76 came 
from China in 1989 and 29.8 percent in 1976. The denominator in this frac-
tion is the total U.S. imports in the product category.
Our measure of the intensity of Chinese competition for Swedish exports 
Table 9.1  Who competes with Sweden in the U.S. market?
Region   1989 (%)   Rank   2004 (%)   Rank   Change (%)
China 0.5 15 5.3 8 4.8
Korea 2.1 11 5.8 7 3.7
Mexico 3.9 7 7.5 5 3.6
Europe 7.6 4 9.4 4 1.7
Great Britain 4.6 5 6.1 6 1.5
Germany 9.5 3 10.2 3 0.7
Middle East 0.7 13 1.1 14 0.4
East Asia 2.1 12 2.4 11 0.3
Central/Carribean 0.3 17 0.5 16 0.2
India 0.2 18 0.3 18 0.2
Africa 0.6 14 0.7 15 0.1
Not available 0.0 19 0.0 19 0.0
Paciﬁ  c 0.5 16 0.4 17 –0.1
South America 2.6 8 2.4 10 –0.2
Italy 2.2 10 1.8 12 –0.5
France 4.2 6 3.6 9 –0.6
Taiwan 2.2 9 1.4 13 –0.8
Canada 19.4 2 12.5 2 –6.9
Japan 27.8 1 12.7 1 –15.1
Total   91.0       83.9       –7.1
Notes: Swedish competition is switching from Japan and Canada to China, Korea, and Mex-
ico. Swedish importance times competitor market share; top ten Countries in 2004 and regions 
excluding these countries; sorted by change.What Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    2 9 9
is the sum of the product of the Swedish importance multiplied by the Chi-
nese market shares. If the Chinese market share were the same in every 
product, then this would be equal to the Chinese market share, because the 
Swedish importance measures sum to one. The competition measure will 
exceed or fall short of the Chinese market share, depending on whether the 
Chinese have large shares of markets that are important sources of Swedish 
export earnings.
The ﬁ  nal columns in table 9.2 labeled “contribution to competition” report 
the Swedish importance multiplied by the Chinese market share, commodity 
by commodity. These numbers are summed to get to the overall competition 
indicator. The table is sorted by the change in this contribution, thus high-
lighting the sources of any change in competition for Swedish exports.
At the very bottom of the table is the overall Chinese market share, which 
rose from 2.5 percent in 1989 to 19.3 percent in 2004. From 1989 to 2004, 
the competition measure rose from 1.1 percent to 9.5 percent, in both cases 
about half the Chinese market share, suggesting that many Chinese exports 
are in products that are unimportant to Sweden. These are typically labor-
  intensive manufactures. For example, in 2004, Chinese goods comprised 
72 percent of U.S. imports of SITC 83, “travel goods, handbags,” and 69 
percent of SITC 85, “footwear,” for which Swedish exports are virtually nil. 
(Incidentally, the competition measure depends on the level of aggregation, 
and the diﬀerence between the measures in table 9.1 and table 9.2 come from 
the fact that the ﬁ  nest product detail is used in table 9.1.)
The products are sorted by their increase in contribution to Swedish-
  Chinese competition between 1989 and 2004. At the top of the list are not 
traditional labor-  intensive products. These new sources of competition are 
telecommunications, manufactures of metal, electrical machinery, and road 
vehicles, a ﬁ  nding that parallels Schott’s (2006) description of the increased 
sophistication of Chinese exports. This seems like a rather ominous devel-
opment for the Swedish economy, as it suggests some serious erosion of the 
degree to which newness protects the Swedish economy from competition 
with China. It is an altogether good thing for Sweden if the Chinese drive 
down the prices of apparel, textiles, and footwear, because Sweden has vir-
tually no exports of these items. That’s only a terms-  of-  trade improvement 
for Sweden. But it is not such a good thing if electrical equipment becomes 
a commodity like T-  shirts and jeans and if Swedish comparative advantage 
in other high-  tech items likewise is eroded.
To explore this issue more carefully, we need to disaggregate the data to 
ﬁ  gure out where exactly the new competition resides. It is possible that at a 
lower level of disaggregation, what is important for Sweden has small Chi-
nese market shares. Table 9.3 reports details for SITC 76, Sweden’s biggest 
problem sector. The ﬁ  rst panel has the three-  digit detail. It is true that this 
disaggregation suggests somewhat less competition between China and Swe-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0304    Edward  E.  Leamer
percent, all of which is from SITC 764. Next, this is disaggregated into the 
four- digit detail, revealing that it is SITC 7643, “transmission apparatus for 
radiotelephony,” and SITC 7643, “parts for telecommunications and sound 
recording,” that is the main source of this increase in competition.
Table 9.4 has the three-  digit detail for two subsets of products: those 
that contributed most to the increase in competition from 1989 to 2004 and 
those that are important for Sweden for which the Chinese market shares 
are relatively small. Again, at the top of the list of contributors to increased 
competition is SITC 764, telecommunications equipment. Next comes SITC 
775, “household electrical and nonelectrical equipment,” then SITC 821, 
“furniture,” then tools and then pharmaceutical products. While these last 
two products are not very important to Sweden, the increase in the Chinese 
market shares was great enough that these products contribute substantially 
to the increase in the measured intensity of Chinese competition for Swed-
ish exports.
The most important sector for Sweden that faced little Chinese competi-
tion is SITC 781, “motor vehicles,” which comprised 41.4 percent of Swedish 
exports in 1989 but only 20.2 percent in 2004. While China has hardly any 
exports to the United States in this category, plans are already in place to 
produce vehicles in China for export to the United States.
Parenthetically, one reason why the rise of Chinese exports is not as 
ominous as it sounds is that a signiﬁ  cant fraction of Chinese export value 
originates in Japan and other high-  wage countries, which ship intermediate 
products and ideas to China, where they are transformed into ﬁ  nal goods 
for export. Nonetheless, some of the value added in Chinese exports surely 
originates in China, and the cost reductions from global production sharing 
with China create a cost disadvantage for Sweden if the same production 
sharing is not exploited also by Swedish manufacturers.
The changing nature of the global marketplace can be met by a cling-
ing to the old industries or by a rapid adjustment away from the sectors in 
which low- wage competition is most problematic. Ideally, losses in jobs and 
production in the losing sectors would be oﬀset by gains in jobs and produc-
tion in the winning sectors. Sweden is not clinging to the past, but on the 
other hand, the winning sectors in manufacturing are few and far between. 
That fact of life puts greater emphasis on the transition from industrial to 
postindustrial work, which is discussed in the next section.
The bad news regarding Swedish employment is displayed in table 9.5, 
which reports the number of Swedish workers in two-  digit International 
Standard Industrial Classiﬁ  cation (ISIC) industries in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 
2003. Industries are sorted by percentage job loss in this period, reported in 
the last column. That loss varies from a 69.2 percent loss in textiles (wear-
ing apparel, footwear, and textiles) to a loss of 10 percent in gasoline. The 
only gain was 11.6 percent for motor vehicles. Theses changes in the mix 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)What Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    3 0 7
low-  wage suppliers of standardized products, to which a response helps 
to maintain the Swedish distinctiveness barrier. As will be discussed in 
the next section, the across-  the-  board losses are not so unusual, as many 
advanced developed countries are experiencing declines in manufacturing 
employment.
It is not just the jobs that are changing. It’s also value added reported in 
table 9.6, which is sorted from losers (of which there are many) to winners 
(of which there are none). Here, we see more of the same.
All in all, the degree of competition between Swedish products and prod-
ucts made in low-  wage emerging economies remains quite low, but storm 
clouds are gathering on the horizon, suggesting the need to take preven-
tative measures to maintain the distinctiveness barrier that has protected 
Swedish workers from low-  wage foreign competition. The proper antidote 
is increased emphasis on innovation in manufacturing and thus educational 
investments for the humans who do the innovating. But the decline in jobs 
in manufacturing and the stagnation overall in value added means that 
Sweden increasingly will have to look elsewhere for sustained economic 
growth.
Table 9.5  Swedish number of employees in two-  digit ISIC manufacturing industries
Number of employees Annualized rate of growth (%)
Total (%)
1980–2003     1980   1990   2000   2003   1980s   1990s   2000s   All  
Total 968.3 885.9 745.7 713 –0.9 –1.7 –1.5 –1.3 –26.4
Textiles (17–19) 40.2 24.6 13.6 12.4 –4.8 –5.8 –3.0 –5.0 –69.2
Metals, basic (27) 67.7 45 31 33.2 –4.0 –3.7 2.3 –3.1 –51.0
Transportation: other (35) 39.9 26.2 20.1 19.7 –4.1 –2.6 –0.7 –3.0 –50.6
Mineral products (26) 30.5 26.7 17.5 18.5 –1.3 –4.1 1.9 –2.2 –39.3
Printing (22) 72.5 70.6 50.9 44.2 –0.3 –3.2 –4.6 –2.1 –39.0
Paper (21) 61.6 53.9 42.1 38.4 –1.3 –2.4 –3.0 –2.0 –37.7
Wood (20) 54 49.6 38.4 36.5 –0.8 –2.5 –1.7 –1.7 –32.4
Food processing (15–16) 82.8 79 62.2 62.8 –0.5 –2.4 0.3 –1.2 –24.2
Electrical (30–33) 103.5 91.6 96.8 79.9 –1.2 0.6 –6.2 –1.1 –22.8
Metal, fabricated (28) 95 93.7 80.4 73.9 –0.1 –1.5 –2.8 –1.1 –22.2
Not elsewhere classiﬁ  ed 
(36–37)
65.4 61.4 54 52.1 –0.6 –1.3 –1.2 –1.0 –20.3
Rubber (25) 29.2 26.7 25.2 23.8 –0.9 –0.6 –1.9 –0.9 –18.5
Chemicals (24) 44.3 39.2 38.6 39.5 –1.2 –0.2 0.8 –0.5 –10.8
Machinery, n.e.c. (29) 110.7 116.3 96.5 99.3 0.5 –1.8 1.0 –0.5 –10.3
Gasoline (23) 3 3.2 2.8 2.7 0.6 –1.3 –1.2 –0.5 –10.0
Motor vehicles (34)   67.9  78.2  75.6  75.8  1.4   –0.3   0.1   0.5  11.6
Notes: Sweden suﬀered two periods of substantial declines in manufacturing employment: 1980 to 1983 
and 1989 to 1993. These declines were pretty much across all sectors, though they were somewhat greater 
in labor-  intensive sectors. Boldface numbers are those greater than 0.0 percent. Boldface numbers in 
shaded boxes are those less than –3.0 percent. Not elsewhere classiﬁ  ed   “n.e.c.”308    Edward  E.  Leamer
Table 9.6  Swedish value added in manufacturing (millions of constant U.S. dollars, 2003)
    1970   1980   1990   2000   2002   Max   Year   Loss (%)
Communication (32) 2,083 1,997 2,803 383 4,089 1998 –91
Apparel (18) 584 277 119 112 584 1980 –81
Transportation: ships (351) 1,221 473 251 242 1,221 1980 –80
Computers (30) 1,019 588 253 267 1,269 1988 –79
Leather (19) 212 103 50 48 212 1980 –77
Textiles (17–19) 1,713 1,555 1,087 611 576 2,126 1975 –73
Gasoline (23) 328 772 553 283 942 1986 –70
Textiles (17–18) 1,343 984 560 528 1,343 1980 –61
Metals, nonferrous 737 748 421 391 899 1988 –57
Electrical (30–33) 5,319 5,738 6,144 3,886 8,291 1998 –53
Transportation: other (35) 2,557 2,005 1,208 1,246 2,557 1980 –51
Transportation: railroad 
(352, 359)
591 536 260 352 693 1992 –49
Wood (20) 2,229 3,871 3,982 2,209 2,161 4,160 1974 –48
Transportation: aircraft (353) 746 997 697 652 1,206 1992 –46
Metals, basic (27) 4,047 3,387 2,323 2,207 4,047 1980 –45
Metals, steel (271 ) 3,310 2,639 1,902 1,816 3,310 1980 –45
Textiles (17) 759 707 441 416 759 1980 –45
Mineral products (26) 1,389 1,782 2,015 1,125 1,119 2,015 1990 –44
Chemicals: other (not 2423) 3,082 3,022 2,193 1,931 3,269 1988 –41
Paper (21) 4,784 5,722 4,830 4,120 6,697 1995 –38
Machinery and equipment 
(29–33)
6,302 12,335 13,986 12,457 10,094 16,290 1996 –38
21–22 5,010 8,110 9,273 8,231 7,102 10,766 1995 –34
Printing (22) 3,327 3,551 3,400 2,983 4,325 1996 –31
Metals (27–28) 5,753 8,385 8,533 6,694 6,164 8,938 1975 –31
Metals and equipment 
(27–35)
15,252 27,100 29,847 26,792 22,209 32,161 1996 –31
Food processing (15–16) 2,350 3,670 5,346 4,020 3,975 5,576 1996 –29
Motor vehicles (34) 3,823 5,322 6,433 4,705 6,433 2000 –27
Transport (34–35) 3,197 6,380 7,327 7,641 5,951 7,969 1988 –25
Instruments (33) 541 1,462 1,480 1,703 2,279 1998 –25
Machinery, n.e.c. (29) 7,017 8,249 6,313 6,208 8,249 1990 –25
Metal, fabricated (28) 4,338 5,146 4,371 3,957 5,146 1990 –23
Not elsewhere classiﬁ  ed 
(36–37)
967 1,414 1,558 1,422 1,291 1,673 1996 –23
Rubber (25) 1,432 1,540 1,433 1,381 1,752 1996 –21
Electric, other (31) 1,675 1,691 1,608 1,533 1,810 1996 –15
23–25 2,939 5,664 6,915 7,198 7,441 7,626 1998 –2
Chemicals (24) 3,904 4,602 5,213 5,777 5,777 2002 0
Chemicals: pharmaceutical 
(2423)
822 1,580 3,019 3,846 3,846 2002 0
Total   31,848  53,166  60,022  51,609  45,875  61,182  1996  –25What Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    3 0 9
9.3    The  Diﬃcult Transition to a Postindustrial Creative Economy
While the problem of competition with low-  wage countries intensiﬁ  es, 
there is a new problem emerging—Sweden and all other advanced devel-
oped countries are experiencing a diﬃcult transition from industrial to 
postindustrial economies, symptomized by a declining fraction of GDP and 
employment in manufacturing production and a rising fraction of GDP and 
employment in creative/ intellectual services. While manufacturing is reason-
ably compatible with a compressed income distribution and an aggressive 
welfare state, the eﬃcient production of creative services is likely to produce 
much greater natural income inequality and greater dissonance with the 
goals of a welfare state. It’s the diﬀerence between Detroit, where there are 
good jobs for many, and Hollywood, where there are great jobs for few.
The transition from industrial to postindustrial economy is likely to be 
more diﬃcult than the transition from agrarian to industrial economy. The 
transition from agrarian to industrial society was driven fundamentally by 
a pull of manual workers oﬀ of the farms into higher- paying  mechanical 
jobs on the factory ﬂ  oor and a parallel elimination of skilled craft jobs in 
artisan shops because of standardization and mechanization in manufactur-
ing. Though entrepreneurial activities at the early stages of industrializa-
tion required great concentrations of capital, giving rise to the inequality 
that so bothered Karl Marx, by the second half of the twentieth century, 
manufacturing had proven its worth in generating good jobs for many and 
a comfortable degree of income equality.
The next transition from industrial to postindustrial economy is being 
driven fundamentally by a push of manual workers oﬀ of the factory ﬂ  oor 
into lower-  paying service jobs in retail and hospitals and a parallel expan-
sion of skilled creative craft jobs in the intellectual services, both traded 
and nontraded.
The word itself—manufacturing—tells us much about the transition from 
agrarian to industrial economies in the ﬁ  rst part of the twentieth century. 
“Manu” in manufacturing is a reference to manual labor. Manufactured 
literally means “built by hand” (with the help of equipment, of course.) In 
a postindustrial age, manufacturing is giving rise to neurofacturing—made 
with the mind. In the industrial age, a mechanic was one who operated 
the equipment, producing reliably identical output, hour after hour. In the 
postindustrial age, mechanical is an epithet, referring to intellectual output 
that is the same as all the others—the last thing we want.
While innovations in equipment spurred by the electric motor have greatly 
increased productivity in manufacturing, most of the innovations of the 
industrial age have made very little encroachment on intellectual tasks, mun-
dane or otherwise. An attorney, an architect, a teacher, and a clerk all did 
about the same work in 1970 as they did in 1800—pushing pencils and ﬁ  l-
ing the work. But the microprocessor has changed the future of intellectual 310    Edward  E.  Leamer
work, eliminating the mundane intellectual tasks and the ﬁ  ling. Think about 
an architect. In 1970, the time of a creative architect partly was consumed 
by the task of rendering the drawings. Some of this work could be done by 
assistants, but the communication costs were often so high that it made more 
sense to have the master do the drawings. The personal computer, however, 
has allowed the architect to render the drawings with great eﬃciency, thus 
freeing up time to do the creative tasks that the computer cannot ever per-
form. Doing economics is the same. I used to hire teams of research assis-
tants and secretaries, but now I do all that work at the touch of a button or 
two on my computer keyboard.
The eﬀect of the personal computer and Internet access has been to elimi-
nate the mundane and to leave mostly the creative tasks. That puts a heavy 
emphasis on creativity and talent, which tends to create a highly unequal 
Hollywood-  style income distribution.
9.3.1      The U.S. Transition from Industrial to Postindustrial Economy
For more than a century beginning in the mid-  1800s, the U.S. economy 
created wealth by moving workers oﬀ of the family farm, where annual 
earnings were low, and onto the factory ﬂ  oor, where annual earnings were 
three times as high (see ﬁ  gure 9.4).
The transition from agrarian to industrial society reduced the fraction of 
the U.S. workforce on farms from 41 percent at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century to 2.5 percent at the end (see ﬁ  gure 9.5). During the ﬁ  rst seven 
decades of the twentieth century, job losses in agriculture were partly oﬀset 
by job gains in manufacturing, as the fraction in manufacturing rose from 
22 percent in 1900 to a peacetime peak of 31 percent in 1953.
1970 Marks the Beginning of the Postindustrial Age for the United States
The U.S. transition from agrarian to industrial society ended in 1970, 
with the workforce in agriculture down to 5 percent and the workforce in 
manufacturing hovering at 27 percent. Thence commenced the more diﬃcult 
transition from industrial to postindustrial society, whose prominent symp-
tom is a collapse in manufacturing jobs, from 27 percent in 1970 to a meager 
11 percent after the recession of 2001.
The speed of this decline in manufacturing opportunities after 1970 from 
a 28 percent share to an 11 percent share was every bit as rapid as the speed 
in the decline of agricultural jobs in the ﬁ  rst seven decades of the twentieth 
century.
9.3.2      This Transition Is Occurring for All 
the Advanced Developed Countries
It is not only the United States that has experienced a sharp decline in 
manufacturing jobs. Figure 9.6 illustrates the declining fraction of manufac-
turing for all OECD countries. In the middle, you can see both the industri-What Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    3 1 1
alization period and the postindustrial period for Korea, with the fraction 
of the workforce in manufacturing peaking in 1990 at 28 percent of the 
workforce. The only other exception to the experience of sharply declining 
manufacturing jobs is the Czech Republic, which had a small increase in the 
share of manufacturing in the 1990s.
Fig. 9.4    Annual earnings in agriculture and manufacturing (Consumer Price Index 
1999 U.S. dollars)
Source: BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics; HSUS = Historical Statistics of the United States.
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Further information about the transitions experienced by these OECD 
countries is reported in table 9.7, which indicates the total number of work-
ers from the OECD STructural ANalysis (STAN) database in 1970, 1980, 
1990, 2000, and 2003, together with the employment shares in manufac-
turing, agriculture, mining, and the rest (services, including government). 
Countries are sorted by their manufacturing shares in 2000, from largest to 
smallest. The values that are in the top 20 percent are printed in bold.
This table indicates the rapid transition into a postindustrial economy for 
almost all of these OECD countries. The Korean data are particularly inter-
esting, because this period encompasses both the period of industrialization, 
in which workers were moved oﬀ of the farm and onto the factory ﬂ  oor, and 
the beginning of the postindustrial period, in which a diminishing share of 
the workforce found jobs in manufacturing. The Korean agricultural share 
falls steadily in this period, from a peak of 47 percent in 1970 to a low of 9 
percent in 2003. That 9 percent is still among the highest, suggesting that this 
trend is not likely to abate. Meanwhile, the Korean share of the workforce in 
manufacturing rose from 14 percent in 1970 to a peak of 28 percent in 1990 
but has fallen dramatically in the 1990s to 20 percent.
Table 9.8 reports the current and the peak levels of employment in manu-
facturing since 1970 for the OECD countries in the STAN database. The 
penultimate column indicates the percent by which the latest available ﬁ  gure 
is less than the peak value, and the last column indicates the year in which 
the peak occurred. The countries are sorted by this last column, roughly 
the point at which this country begins the diﬃcult transition into a postin-
dustrial economy. By this measure, Sweden was among the ﬁ  rst countries to 
experience the end of the manufacturing age. Employment in manufacturing 
in Sweden was the greatest at the very start of the time period covered. From 
that value of 1.04 million in 1970, manufacturing employment had fallen 32 
percent by 2003. The long- term downward trend in manufacturing employ-
ment was punctuated by a very sharp decline in the crisis of the early 1990s, 
from which Swedish manufactures recovered only in the sense of not losing 
more workers (see ﬁ  gure 9.7). Meanwhile, value added in manufactures, 
illustrated in ﬁ  gure 9.8, has only the most modest upward trend, if any, and 
is punctuated by periodic recessions.
9.3.3      The Industrial Model and the Postindustrial Model
Figure 9.9 compares the growth in real per capita incomes for fourteen 
OCED countries in three decades for which the data are complete with the 
corresponding decline in agricultural share. Sure enough, we see the force 
of the old business model: those countries that most rapidly moved work-
ers oﬀ of the farms are the ones that experienced the most rapid increase 
in per capita incomes. With agricultural shares very low in many OECD 
countries, most notably only 2 percent in Sweden, that industrialization 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    2001   2002   2003   Loss   Year max
The Netherlands 1.53 1.08 1.06 1.03 –33 1970
Sweden 1.04 0.75 0.73 0.71 –32 1970
Belgium 1.17 0.66 0.63 0.61 –48 1970
Denmark 0.64 0.45 0.43 0.42 –34 1970
United Kingdom 7.88 4.08 3.88 –51 1971
Australia 1.38 1.10 –21 1973
Austria 0.88 0.66 0.65 0.64 –27 1973
France 5.64 3.85 3.79 –33 1974
Finland 0.58 0.46 0.45 0.44 –25 1974
Norway 0.39 0.29 0.29 0.27 –30 1974
Spain 2.98 2.93 2.92 2.86 –4 1978
United States 21.53 18.07 –16 1979
Italy 6.21 5.16 5.20 5.21 –16 1980
Portugal 1.14 1.01 0.99 0.98 –14 1981
Luxembourg 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 –12 1986
Canada 2.20 2.17 2.15 2.15 –2 1989
New Zealand 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.25 –4 1989
Germany 10.58 8.13 7.95 7.74 –27 1991
Korea 5.16 4.27 4.24 4.21 –18 1991
Japan 15.27 12.16 11.58 11.33 –26 1992
Hungary 1.05 0.96 0.96 0.93 –12 1992
Greece 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 –9 1996
Poland 3.13 2.64 2.56 –18 1997
Czech Republic 1.45 1.34 1.38 1.38 –5 1997
Slovak Republic 0.59 0.52 0.51 0.51 –13 1997
Iceland 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 –13 1997
Ireland   0.30   0.30  0.29  0.28  –6   2001
Note: Transition to a postindustrial society; sorted by year in which maximum occurred.
Fig. 9.7    Swedish employment in manufactures (thousands)316    Edward  E.  Leamer
Fig. 9.8    Swedish value added in manufactures: Millions of U.S. dollars, 2003
Fig. 9.9    Growth and the movement of workers oﬀ of the farmWhat Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    3 1 7
Figure 9.10 displays the value added fractions of manufacturing and 
ﬁ  nance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) over time for the United States. 
In 1987, 20 percent of U.S. GDP originated in manufacturing and 16 percent 
in FIRE. But the data trace out a large and ominous X, with FIRE crossing 
manufacturing in 1996, just when the Internet rush was beginning. Is that the 
essence of the new economy? We don’t make anything anymore, but instead 
celebrate our genius in a gigantic parasitic bonFIRE?
Further details about the structure of U.S. earnings are reported in table 
9.9, which reports the shares of earnings at the two-  digit North American 
Industry Classiﬁ  cation System (NAICS) level of aggregation. This new 
NAICS scheme was explicitly adopted to deal with the emerging knowledge 
work in the United States, and I have grouped the categories into manufac-
turing (including construction and transportation), distribution, services, 
government, and neurofacturing (information, ﬁ  nance, and professional 
and business services). Neurofacturing by this imperfect rendering now 
encompasses about 36 percent of earnings, while manufacturing is only 24 
percent.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis discussion of 2007 ﬁ  rst-  quarter U.S. 
growth further illustrates the importance of ﬁ  nancial activities in U.S. 
growth:
Personal income in only ﬁ  ve states (New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Illinois, and Delaware) grew faster than the national average. Another 
four states matched the national growth rate and the rest of the states 
and the District of Columbia grew slower. This geographical concentra-
tion of personal income growth is attributable to the unusually strong 
contribution to earnings growth of the ﬁ  nance industry centered in New 
York (and to a lesser extent in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Illinois). 
The ﬁ  nance industry alone accounted for 38 percent of the nation’s earn-
ings growth in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2007 and earnings growth in these ﬁ  ve 
states accounted for 36 percent of the nation’s growth. Connecticut and 
New Jersey also beneﬁ  ted disproportionately because of their commuting 
ﬂ  ows into New York—personal income represents the income of a state’s 
residents regardless of where it is earned. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 2007)
9.3.4      Postindustrial Earnings, Inequality, and Opportunity
While the shift out of manufacturing and into ﬁ  nance is clear in the data, 
what is not clear is the eﬀect that the personal computer and the Inter-
net are having on the market for intellectual services. A proper time series 
study of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a look at 
the compensation in ﬁ  nance and manufacturing in the United States and 
in Sweden at one point in time sheds some light on the issues. The U.S. 
hourly and weekly earnings in 1999 to 2000 at the 10th, 50th, and 90th 
percentiles are reported in table 9.10 by gender and by skills (blue-   and 318    Edward  E.  Leamer
white-  collar occupations) and by sector (manufacturing, ﬁ  nance, and real 
estate). Weekly earnings are divided by hourly earnings to estimate apparent 
weekly hours.
This table and the corresponding ﬁ  gures are intended to help answer this 
question: what kind of earnings, inequality, and eﬀort are characteristic of 
a postindustrial society? The table is sorted ﬁ  rst by gender and then by the 
inequality measure: 90/  10 ratio of weekly earnings.
Table 9.9  U.S. earnings shares, 2006 (%)
  U.S. 2006 national income without capital consumption adjustment   100  
Manufacturing 24.3
  Agriculture,  forestry,  ﬁ  shing, and hunting 0.7
  Mining 1.7
  Utilities 1.6
  Construction 5.3
  Manufacturing 12.1
  Transportation  and  warehousing 3.0
Distribution 13.5
  Wholesale  trade 6.1
  Retail  trade 7.3
Services 14.5
    Other services, except government 2.4
    Educational services, health care, and social assistance 8.4
    Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 3.6
Government 11.7
Neurofacturing 35.5
  Information 3.7
    Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 18.0
    Professional and business services 13.8
  Rest of the world   0.5  
Fig. 9.10    Manufacturing and FIRE fraction of national income
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First, consider the mix of jobs. (Keep in mind that to highlight the transi-
tion issues from industrial to postindustrial work, the jobs here are limited 
to those in three sectors: manufacturing, ﬁ  nance, and real estate.)
•   The three largest job categories for both men and women are blue-
  collar jobs in manufacturing and white-  collar jobs in manufacturing 
and ﬁ  nance. That’s a pretty fair characterization of the job transition 
from industrial to postindustrial: from semiskilled manual work in 
manufacturing to highly skilled brain work in intellectual services.
•   Men are greatly overrepresented in the blue- collar occupations in manu-
facturing. In contrast, there are almost as many white-  collar as blue-
 collar women in manufacturing, and there are more white- collar women 
in ﬁ  nance than blue-  collar women in manufacturing.
Possible implication: the transition from manufacturing to ﬁ  nance and real 
estate requires a more educated and more talented workforce. This may be 
more diﬃcult for men than for women. After all, manufacturing starts with 
man.
Next, consider earnings. For this discussion, some ﬁ  gures are helpful. 
Figure 9.11 illustrates U.S. data on weekly earnings at the 10th and 90th 
percentiles for men and women. (The female blue-  collar real estate sector 
is excluded, because the data includes only two observations.) Figure 9.12 
illustrates the corresponding 90/  10 ratios.
•    One thing that stands out in these ﬁ  gures is the clear positive associa-
tion between median pay and inequality. If the higher- paid white- collar 
occupations were a simple translation of the low- paid occupations, with 
each individual in the higher- paid occupation receiving a ﬁ  xed multiple 
of the lower- paid job, then the median would change, but the 90/ 10 ratio 
would stay exactly the same. In fact, what happens is that the 90/ 10 ratio 
increases along with the median, making the 90/  10 ratio higher for the 
white-  collar jobs than the blue-  collar jobs.
•    In addition to the skill eﬀect, there is also a gender eﬀect: males have 
both higher earnings and greater inequality than females.
•    The inequality of the white-  collar jobs comes especially at the top of 
the distribution—the 50th percentiles are only moderately higher than 
the 10th percentile. This is particularly the case for males in white- collar 
jobs in ﬁ  nance and real estate.
Implication: the U.S. postindustrial economy has a lot of inequality at the top, 
especially for men.
Next, we can take a look at the relationship between hours per week and 
the hourly wage rate. Inside of manufacturing, there is a close association 
between hours worked, capital intensity, and hourly rates of pay. There is 
an economic reason for this, explained in Leamer (1999) and explored in What Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    3 2 1
Leamer and Thornberg (2000). Expensive capital is eﬃciently deployed by 
spreading the ﬁ  xed capital charges over the largest amount of labor input, 
which means operating the equipment at high speed for long hours during 
the day. Accordingly, the capital- intensive operations in manufacturing oﬀer 
workers a special contract: a high hourly wage for hard work and long hours 
per day.
Figure 9.13 explores this idea for the data in table 9.10 by comparing 
the apparent hours worked per week with the average hourly earnings at 
the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles. The association between eﬀort as 
measured by hours per week and wages for blue-  collar workers is weak, 
Fig. 9.11    Earnings: 90/  10 ratio of weekly earnings
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possibly because over this sample, these workers are operating about the 
same amount of capital. But for white-  collar workers, there is a very clear 
tendency for higher hourly pay to come with higher weekly hours. The 
human capital that these knowledge workers acquired in school and on 
the job is very great, and it is economically ineﬃcient to have that sit idle 
during short work weeks, long coﬀee breaks, and abundant vacation time. 
The U.S. economy responds eﬃciently to that reality with a reward system 
that puts a premium on hard work. You could call it inequality, but it is also 
opportunity. Possible implication: the very expensive human capital operated 
by knowledge workers in the intellectual service sectors will earn its highest 
rate of return if operated for long hours over the lifetime. A country seeking 
to have high growth, therefore, will see that scarce human capital is allocated 
to those willing to work hard.
Sweden
The corresponding Swedish earnings are reported in table 9.11. The earn-
ings compression of the Swedish economy is evident in comparison of the 
90/  10 ratios with the U.S. ratios. For white-  collar workers, these are illus-
trated in ﬁ  gure 9.14. (To make the next point, I would also need data on 
hours worked.) Possibility: to get the highest return on its investment in human 
capital, Sweden needs more opportunity.
9.4    Conclusions
Once, the United States entreated Europe (a plaque on the Statue of 
Liberty):
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-  tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!
Fig.  9.13  Eﬀort and payWhat Have Changes to the Global Markets Done?    3 2 3
Then, we needed manufacturing workers. Today, wealth is created in the 
postindustrial intellectual services. Now, our Statue of Liberty says to 
Sweden:
Give me your educated, your bright,
Your hardworking youth yearning to breathe free,
The sweet cream of your egalitarian consommé.
Send these, the suppressed, becalmed to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!







    D9   D5   D1   D9/D1   D9   D5   D1   D9/D1   D9   D5   D1   D9/D1
Blue collar
Male 2,919 2,437 2,065 1.41 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,869 2,276 1,855 1.55
Female 2,634 2,214 1,917 1.37 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,424 1,979 1,793 1.35
Total 2,882 2,399 2,028 1.42 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,721 2,127 1,830 1.49
White collar
Male 5,491 3,376 2,474 2.22 7,198 3,896 2,461 2.92 5,566 3,463 2,226 2.5
Female 4,329 2,746 2,152 2.01 4,440 2,869 2,177 2.04 4,242 2,696 1,942 2.18
Total 5,195 3,166 2,300 2.26 5,887 3,191 2,239 2.63 5,096 3,092 2,028 2.51
Total
Male 4,193 2,647 2,115 1.98 7,186 3,884 2,437 2.95 5,182 3,018 1,991 2.6
Female 3,636 2,412 1,979 1.84 4,428 2,857 2,140 2.07 3,983 2,474 1,830 2.18
Total   4,057  2,585  2,065  1.96   5,862  3,179  2,214  2.65   4,774  2,746  1,892  2.52
Note: n.a.   not applicable. 
Fig. 9.14    U.S. and Sweden white-  collar 90/  10 ratios324    Edward  E.  Leamer
Appendix
Competition Measure
The algebra needed to derive the competition measure depends on the 
price elasticity,
1/   j   price elasticity in destination/  product market j.
If the demand function in destination/  product market j (three exporters) is
pj    j(x1j   x2j   x3j)  j,
then the export revenue of country 1 is
R1   
j ∑x1jpj   
j ∑x1j j(x1j   x2j   x3j)  j.
To compute the hypothetical increase in exports, note that the importance 
measure is the value of exports in the category divided by total exports T:




Holding prices ﬁ  xed, an across-  the-  board expansion of exports increases T 
and increases each export item by a like amount:
dx2j  
dT2




Given this increase in exports, the responsiveness of the revenue of country 
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      average elasticity of the exports of country 1 
multiplied by the average market share of 
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Then, if all markets have the same elasticity, this becomes
dR1/  R1  
dT2/  T2
     
j ∑I1jM2j,
which ﬁ  nally reduces to ΣjI1jM2j when     1.
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